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THE SOUTH AFRICAN REBELLION OF 1914: THE INFLUENCE OF
INDUSTRIALISATION, POVERTY AND 'POOR WHITEISM1
John Bottomley
Die sprinkaan en die droogte
is swaar op onse land
en wat van ons moet worde
is bowe myn verstand
Die geld is ook te danig skaars
en die koffie word so duur
die vreemde bank is ons baas
en die "intres" vreet soos vuur1
But already in the long drought many of
these people had lost what little they had
and rebellion does not seem such a serious
thing to desperate men.2
In 1914, just four years after Union and twelve years .. :
after the Anglo-Boer War, armed struggle again broke out in
South Africa. This time the struggle was fraternal, a
broedertwis, or civil war between Afrikaner forces.
The established interpretation of the rebellion sees the
'Imperial connection1 as being responsible for the aberration
of Afrikaner fighting Afrikaner. According to this viewpoint,
when the First World War broke out, thousands of patriots
shrewdly judged their chances against a weakened Britain;
still deeply bitter at the Anglo-Boer War and anxious for a
true Afrikaner republic, they rose in rebellion against a
government which no longer reflected their interests.
In common with much South African history, the rebellion
has tended to be observed from a strictly political perspec-
tive, with scant attention being paid to other possible
causes. E.A. Walker wrote only of 'a vague malaise, a
feeling that the Afrikaners were somehow oppressed by all the
social, political and economic forces which rightly or
wrongly they associated with the name of Britain1, N.G.
Garson too, was content only to note the 'interesting but
fruitless speculation of how many 'poor whites' joined in,"1
whilst T.R.H. Davenport in a footnote indicated that 'poverty
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and drought were certainly conditioning factors1, but that
'... one looks in vain for attempts to exploit economic
grievances in the speeches of the rebel leaders1.5 Memoirs
written by the rebel leaders and their biographers tend to
support such views by ignoring all but political motivations
as causes of the rebellion.6
In the face of such seemingly conclusive evidence it is
not surprising that the political interpretation of the
rebellion has become dogma. It was the historian W.M.
Macmillan though, who warned us against an unwary acceptance
of primary material in South African history. He pointed to
the'distorting effects of the political polarization that
accompanied the Anglo-Boer War. The instance he gave of
such distortion was the 'seemingly illogical1 lack of
expressions of discontent amongst Afrikaners, at the forced
trek of farmers to urban areas. He wrote: 'It is highly
characteristic of South Africa that no such voice is ever
heard, and that the form of discontent is a peculiar non-
sequitur - an almost delirious demand that 'the Government1
should 'tackle the Native problem'. There is a danger that
this 'red herring1 will go on all too completely distracting
attention from the defects of these purely European institu-
tions and customs of the country.side - the abuse of the
great land 'heritage1 we hear talk of. In this rather than
in direct British-Dutch feuds the country suffers the penalty
for the events of 1899-1902. A sentimental bond of
Afrikaner (not South African) national unity distracts men's
minds from the essentials of bread-and-butter politics.
Blinded by national sentiment, the poor voter, even the
landless, is really too little class conscious.'7 The
dogma which has evolved since the rebellion contains some
semblance of truth, and undoubtedly many of the rebels were
patriots. Yet the monocausality of such an approach denies
the enormous complexity of motivations which must underline
a rebellion against kith and kin. More particularly this
interpretation denies the element of self-preservation, a
fundamental fact of life. It is only in terms of an
understanding of both the causes and extent of the crisis
conditions facing so many farmers by 1914, that the
rebellion can truly be understood.
There were those even at the time of the rebellion
mainly in government circles, who questioned a strictly
political interpretation of events, as in two apprehensive
letters Merriman wrote to Smuts in December 1915: f ... I
refer to the question of the Poor White This question
constitutes a great and growing evil - of the four really
important questions before us it is by far - to my mind -
the most important as its growth and persistence threaten
the very foundations of our national existence. I need not
enlarge to you on the magnitude of the disease - recent
events both in the rebellion, and in the elections that
followed, must have convinced even the dullest of us - and
I hope neither of us is dull - of the dire possibilities
that lie before us from this course!'8 In a further letter
written on the same day, he expanded"on the theme: 'I did
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not for obvious reasons enlarge on the political side - that
is very important. These wretched folk are the rank and file
of the Nationalist brigade ready for any mischief. They are
the raw materials in which the Predikant, the country
attorney, all the carpetbaggers and Graeculi esuventes of the
Bar work.19 Similarly, Raymond Harley, the magistrate of
Winburg in the Orange Free State, told the Judicial
Commission on the rebellion that, '... Conroy {a rebel leader)
had been canvassing very acutely for recruits in the northern
part of the district and part of the Hoopstad district and
most of his recruits were gentlemen whom he found it necessary
to equip with new clothes and boots ... At that time he had
a half dozen men with him who could be called wealthy and
influential, but the great majority of his followers were of
the bywoner class. He also commandeered foodstuffs and fed
these people and issued foodstuffs to their families.110
Mr.A.M. Baumann, a 'law agent1 in Winburg, concurred with
the magistrate saying that very few of the larger landowners
went, and that the rebels were mainly people heavily in debt
and youngsters, 'but not men of substance or standing'.11
E.A. Learn, the magistrate of Harrismith similarly told of
large poor white support for the rebellion in the Harrismith
and Bethlehem districts where 'people of the poorer or
bywoner class and youngsters rebelled, but men of property
or standing stayed at home, and sent their sons1. A.J.
Brand, son of the late President of the Orange Free State
and magistrate of Lindley agreed: 'the class of people who
joined the rebels did not bother much about politics they
were on the "loot": that was their object. They were not
people of standing or responsibility. The more influential
and the wealthier class kept quiet1'.13 Commandant H.J.
Lombard of Lichtenburg in the western Transvaal pointed out
that in his area 'the greater part of the people are quite
simple ... Many people suffered big losses in the war and
got nothing in return and for money they will do anything1.
Whilst economic motivations have often been dismissed as
legitimating causes of the rebellion yet, as some contem-
poraries were aware and as this paper will show, the
rebellion was caused in part, by the ruinous economic
environment prior to the rebellion.
In real terms the first phase of the 1914 rebellion began
on 9 October 1914 when Lieutenant=Colonel S.G. 'Manie'
Maritz, district staff officer of the frontier region with
German South West Africa, went into rebellion. The 'Maritz
Rebellion1 wds. relatively unsuccessful, and Maritz was unable
to motivate much support for his cause in the western Cape.
He was considering disbanding his forces when rebellion
broke out in the two former republics and convinced him to
continue the struggle. The rebellion by Maritz influenced
the second phase of the rebellion on 22. October 1914. The
ringleaders of this phase were C.R. De Wet who, thereafter,
mobilized rebel commandos in the Free State and C.F. Beyers,
former Commandant-General of the Union Defence Force, who
mobilized rebel forces in the Transvaal. Another important
rebel leader in the Transvaal was Major. J.C.C. Kemp, officer
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commanding the 1,400 men in the defence force camp at
Potchefstroom.
During November 1914 rebel resistance in the Free State
collapsed. The following month Government forces overran
the Transvaal and January of the following year saw the
rebel resistance in the northern Cape overwhelmed. It was
subsequently revealed that 190 rebels had been killed and
132 government troops. The estimate of the number of men
who went into rebellion was given as 11,472, of whom 7,123
came from the Free State, 2,998 from the Transvaal and
1,252 from the Cape.11*
We now turn to an examination of conditions in the Orange
Free State, this being the most intensive area of rebellion
in South Africa. The Free State was also the province most
ravaged by wars, rebellion, natural depredations, economic
depressions and industrial unrest. There were wars against
the Basuto in the years 1858, 1865 and 1867-68 of which a
contemporary wrote "... Dire were the effects of the long
protracted struggle upon the country, commercial and other
business was pretty well ruined, the burghers impoverished
to the last degree, their farming operations having been
neglected for so long a period1. Major droughts occurred
during the years 1846, 1851-4, 1884 and 1885 and were
followed by the devastating Rinderpest epidemic of 1896.
During this epidemic thousands of transport riders were
ruined by the wholesale destruction of their spans of oxen
and, because of the carnage, the lifeline of the country
was practically severed. The economy was thereby paralysed
and many farming communities were isolated and unable to
transport their produce to market. As a result: 'The Uit-
lander farmers turned to storekeeping and transport riding
with donkeys. The Afrikaner stockmen, used in times of
adversity to turning to their richer bretheren and becoming
bijwoners or quasi-tenants of small plots on their lands,
now had no source of help and drifted as \Arme-Blankes'
or poor whites to the towns1.16 From the 1860s there was a
growing rift in Afrikaner society between those of substance
benefitting from the opportunities provided by industrialisa-
tion, and those in the process of being dispossessed as a
result of the new economic environment. The devastation
caused by the Rinderpest epidemic magnified this rift in
society; Thelma Gutsche went so far as to pronounce that '±t
was now that the Boer War was lost1.17 The societal differ-
entiation certainly seems to have had a deleterious effect,
on the Boer War as noted by Sir Arnold Theiler who fought
with the Boer forces: 'An exceptionally meticulous and
observant recorder, Theiler now saw the moral and physical
deterioration of the burghers through years of ruination by
Rinderpest, drought, locusts and pestilences which had
abased the economy and broken their fighting spirit. The
war had come as a godsend to the impoverished denizens of
the many 'Burghersdorps'. They had flocked to enlist and,
palpably hot fighting material, were the least suitable
'to go on commando1. With the war not two months old,
Theiler wrote of 'those who fled from conflict and otherwise
showed no signs of patriotism1 . 18 Recent research supports
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Theiler's observations, and has revealed that even in the
first year of the Anglo-Boer War, Afrikaner society failed
to present a homogeneous front to the enemy. In the face
of this onslaught, the solidarity of Boer society became
dangerously eroded by divisions between 'Bittereinders', who
were prepared to fight the war to the end, and 'Joiners1 who
collaborated in enormous numbers with the British forces
against their own people. Wa now know that 'the majority of
rank and file collaborators during the war were members of
a disgruntled, landless and under-privileged pre-war class
within Afrikaner society1.19
T~he Anglo-Boer War was to have an even more devastating
impact on the Free State. Discussing the war G.B. Beak, an
official in the British reconstruction programme wrote,
"... being almost a purely pastoral and agricultural area,
perhaps no portion of South Africa was thrown back further
by the war than the O.R.C.|2° Whole towns such as Lindley
and Frankfort were razed to the ground and the southern
districts were left a 'barren wilderness1 whilst the
northern districts fared little better.
In the immediate post-war period thousands of Boers had
to be forced from British prison camps, having nothing left
to begin life anew. At the end of Septraber 1902, four months
after the cessation of hostilities, there were still 17,005
people left in British prison camps, mainly in the Free ;
State.21 In September 1904 a congress was convened at Brand-
fort to discuss conditions in the Free State. The crux of
the Brandfort congress was an appeal for assistance from
the reconstruction government published in De Vriend: 'we
are aware that the poverty in our land has reached a crisis.
We know that there are many families lacking the bare
necessities. The grievances we have are legion. Misery
increases every day.'22 A severe recession had manifested
itself the previous year which was to last until 1908, and
it was only in the latter year that conditions improved with
European markets opening up for South African produce and
encouraging Free State production.23 However, 1910 saw the
'Great Depression1 in that province, and although the drought
lifted somewhat during 1911, the years following to 1916
were years of intense and ruinous drought. Concurrent with
the drought the recession returned, and was heightened by
industrial unrest during 1913 and 1914, the outbreak of the
Great War in August 1914, and the rebellion which followed
still later in that year.
In examining those economic conditions in the Free State
which helped to precipitate the 1914 rebellion, it is
important to note the uneven effects of industrialisation
as a result of the geographical diversity of the province.
Following the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s, indus-
trialisation began affecting land usage in the Free State
with far-reaching results on the existing society. In the
south-western districts of the Free State, the growth of
the diamond fields created enormous agricultural opportunities
for those progressive farmers capable of responding away
from subsistence agriculture. Those who were very success-
ful amongst such farmers evolved into a class of %heeren-
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boeren* or gentlemen farmers, distinguished from other cattle-
farmers by their wealth and the size of their landholdings.Zh
This burgeoning class was able to expand its landholdings by"
buying out smaller farmers, particularly after the.Anglo-
Boer War when it proved impossible for many of the smaller
stockmen to reconstitute their farming operations. Inflated
stock prices in the post-war period thrust many smaller
stockmen from their lands, but there was also the severe and
recurrent drought conditions. Such conditions particularly
affect pastoral farming because, 'in pastoral farming
droughts destroy not only the costs of labour of one year,
as i'n arable farming, but also a considerable part of the
capital1.25 Those farmers whose income was wholly tied up in
their farms often lost all during the war, unlike many of
the 'heerenboeren ' class who had diverse sources of income
in mining, stocks and shares, land and other forms of
speculation.^ Following the war this class with ready cash,
was able to restock and reconstitute its farming operations.
Additionally, Milner's reconstruction programme allocated
what were for this desolate period, large cash loans of
between £300 to £500. In order to bring about rapid recon-
struction, loans were granted to those farmers who had the
best chance of survival and growth, most often the 'heeren-
boeren' class. In the harsh post-war environment only the
man of private means could hope to survive. For those
farmers that failed, all that was left was to trek outside
the Free State. The number of failed farmers migrating from
the Free State increased rapidly soon after the war although
the process was to some extent masked by inter-provincial
migration into the Free State. Between 1911 and 1921, however,
the exodus from these districts became so great that each of
the south-western districts recorded a decrease of more than
10% in their White populations.27
The south-western Free State is only one of three broad
regions in the Orange Free State. The distinction between
the regions is drawn geographically by greatly differing
annual rainfall rates, and broad changes in soil fertility.28
The natural line of demarcation between the diamondiferous
and largely pastoral south-western region, and the north-
eastern region, runs diagonally across the Free State and
through the districts of Boshoff, Winburg, Thaba Nchu and
Wepener. Thus the south-western districts are taken to
include Bethulie, Boshoff, most of the Bloemfontein district,
Edenburg, Fauresmith, Jacobsdal and Philippolis. Whilst
included in the north-eastern districts are Bethlehem, the
other parts of the Bloemfontein district, Frankfort,
Harrismith, Heilbron, Hoopstad, Kroonstad, Lindley, Senekal,
Vrede, Vredefort and Winburg. The northern districts, with
higher rainfall and greater fertility evolved into the
'maize triangle1 of the Free State.
The other broad region of the Free State is that area in
the east along the Caledon River, the so-called 'conquered
territory1. The.eastern districts include Ficksburg, Lady-
brand, Rouxville, Smithfield, Wepener and Thaba Nchu.29 This
eastern region differs from either the north-east or south-
west by virtue of being the most fertile area of the Free
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State, the 'wheat granary1 of the province. Here the price
of agricultural land was high, farms were on average smaller,
and these districts more closely settled than either of the
other two regions in the Free State. Here the agricultural
communities tended to be old, settled and well-to-do.
Of the six eastern districts only Ficksburg and Smithfield
went into rebellion. Ficksburg was closely tied to , and
influenced by the neighbouring district of Bethlehem which
was the seat of rebellion in the Free State. Smithfield,
Hertzog's own constituency went into rebellion somewhat
perfunctorily, and very late. The eastern Free State was
largely self-sufficient and, being less affected by economic
vagaries than the other regions, remained to some extent an
observer in the rebellion. As such it is not proposed to
discuss this region in any detail.
One is immediately struck by the fact that the rebellion
in the Free State was largely confined as Hertzog noted, to
'... those six or seven districts in the north1- In the
other region of the Free State, the south-west, only Brand-
fort and Dewetsdorp in the Bloemfontein district, the rural
parts of a much urbanised district went into rebellion.
In accounting for the focus of the rebellion almost solely
in the north-east of the Free State, it is misleading to
point to the influence of a leader such as General de Wet
who lived there, without determining why the south-eastern
districts as a whole, refused to join the rebellion. It
would seem that a major reason why there was no rebellion in
the south-western districts, was that as a result of
industrialisation, the traditimal pre-industrial society
was in the process of dissolving. As has already been shown,
the coming into being of the 'heerenboeren' class, together
with the comparative strength of this class after the war,
led to the enclosure of large areas of land, and the forced
exodus of a significant proportion of the existing population.
Discussing the population decline in the pastoral south-west
the census of 1920 noted: f... the decrease in population ..
could only be attributed to the fact that certain of the more
prosperous farmers have bought up all the farms coming into
the market during the past few years and used them as cattle
farms, thus displacing one or more European families... the
chief factor was the tendency of farms to change hands at
high prices and to come under the control of progressive
farmers. It has been observed in many parts of the country
that this phase of agricultural progress has sounded the
death knell of the agricultural class peculiar to South
Africa known as bijwoners..' a At war's end British recon-
struction officials found that they were helping to create
a new society rather than, reconstituting the pre-war
society: 'The object of the Department was to provide
employment for indigent burghers or "poor whites", and to
assist in closing the Refugee Camps of the people to whom
it was otherwise impossible to repatriate. The "Bywoner"
problem - a serious and abstruse one even before the war - was
rendered infinitely more troublesome by the inability
of farmers who employed these men on their farms to take
them back at the close of hostilities ... ' n In the
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decade from the war to the rebellion, the position of the"
'bywaners ' and poor whites deteriorated even further as the
price of land spiralled. As Mr O.A. 'Ockie1 Oosthuisen, a
Member of Parliament, noted: 'Of course these people, with
few exceptions have been used to working with live animals,
and one of the greatest difficulties is to find room on the
land for them to farm stock. The landowners now have made
it almost a universal rule that they cannot afford to let
people run their stock on their lands. Formerly these people
had their own land, with perhaps 200 to 300 head of stock
but now the land has become so expensive that their owners
do not allow them to bring their stock on their lands ...
They had to dispose of it because they had no stock to run
it on.33 'Bijwoners' and 'poor whites', those on the lowest
rung of White society with little to contribute to the
emerging commercial environment, were being undermined and
dispossessed. This class of Free State society was not the
only group to experience insecurity, however, smaller farmers
were also suffering.
The dismeinberment of the pre-industrial society in the
south-west was made easier by a concurrent and apparently
contradictory process: in those pastoral districts where
smaller farmers were facing collapse following the war, land
prices were simultaneously rising. The closing of the land
frontier began a period of escalating prices as land hunger
spread. With land being the only source of wealth, status
and existence in rural areas, it is easy to understand why
farmers were prepared to pay high prices for obviously
unprofitable land- Farmers unable to afford land in the
Cape where the land frontier was first reached, and where
prices escalated in advance of the other provinces, moved
northwards into the Free State. Between 1904 and 1911 the
Free State experienced a 2 9.6% increase in White population
in rural areas, and a 9.12% increase in urban areas..9* After
1911, however, even this enormous influx could not mask the
exodus of farmers from the south-eastern districts. Many of
these farmers were forced to move to the peripheral, and
more arid areas of the country or further northwards to the
Rhodesias, Kenya, etc.35
There was a dramatic increase in the White population of
the less fertile areas of South Africa between 1904 and
1911; the population of Kenhardt in the north-western Cape
increased by 78.29% during this period, whilst that of the
north-western Transvaal including such areas as Lichtenburg
and Wolmaranstad increased by 40.43%.* The considerable
influx of population into these districts indicated both
increasing land scarcity, and the failure of many pastoralists
to recover from the Anglo-Boer War. Extensive inter-
provincial migration had far-readhing effects on the older
pre-industrial society of the southern Free State; this
society was not destroyed but was forced to reconstitute
itself in the more arid areas of South Africa. The
pull which these arid regions exerted through the
appeal of lower land prices meant that such J.areas
became pools of defeated Free Staters nurturing their
grievances against a government which they believed had
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failed them. Discussing the influx and influence of Free
Staters in the Lichtenburg district, the postmaster told the
rebellion commission: 'About that time a number of Free
Staters trekk.ed into the Lichtenburg district, and greatly
influenced political opinion there. That was in 1914.
Ground was then being sold at unprecedented high prices in
the Free State, and they were selling out and buying twice
as much land with the money in Lichtenburg as they had in
the Free State. They also brought their Free State ideas
with them of course .... I think the influx of Free Staters
brought the people over to the rebels' side. Of course
every Free Stater brought into the district was against the
Botha government.f v The bitterness caused by the failure of
the government to support these smaller pastoralists was
nurtured amidst the harsh conditions of their new homes and
these areas all went into rebellion in 1914.
As had already been indicated, the situation in the
agrarian north-eastern Free State was dissimilar to that in
the pastoral south. In the south the war delivered the
coup de grace to what remained of the older society. In the
north-east, the influence of industrialisation was only felt
from the 18 90s, following the discovery of gold, when the
ripple effects of this huge new industry began the process
of class differentiation. Thereafter, the pre-industrial
social structure came under increasing pressure. Following
the war first Milner and then Selborne, the British High
Commissioners, sought to reconstruct South African agricul-
ture. It was primarily the agrarian areas of the Transvaal
and north-eastern Free State which benefitted from the input
of substantial new financial resources; the granting of
compensation payments for war losses, state loans and
subsidies, credit for fencing and dam-building, the provision
of creameries and experimental farms and the extension of
the railway system.™ Agricultural supports were intended
to assist mainly progressive, capitalizing farmers as was the
case with the southern 'heerenboeren'. In the north-east,
however,.the agrarian base of agriculture and the improved
agricultural environment provided by reconstruction supports
enabled smaller farmers with little capital to survive. As
a result, the pre-industrial society was to some extent
reconstituted in the north, but it was not long before
intense pressures arose, which threatened the poorer farmers,
the 'poor whites' and 'bywoners ' in the north. These
pressures were to be an important factor in the rebellion.
In the north-eastern districts of the Free State, under-
capitalized farmers had long found their means of survival
in land subdivision, and by resorting to the system of land
tenure known as sharecropping. In the post-war environment,
however, these former agricultural supports had evolved.,
instead into factors precipitating the dispossession of
farmers.
Following the war the farms of many of those killed in
action were subdivided amongst all the heirs according to
Roman Dutch law. Although the legislation relating to sub-
division was repealed in 1901, it continued to influence
land conveyancing in the province. Further impetus was
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given to subdivision by the closing of the land frontier and
resultant rise in land prices. Subdivision was more practical
in the fertile northern districts because of the arable nature
of farming, as opposed to the pastoral south where far larger
landholdirigs were required to keep stock. As a result of
subdivision northern farms diminished in size and prolifer-
ated. The prevailing belief was that no matter how hopelessly
small or uneconomical subdivided farms became, relatives
would at least have a 'sitplekkie1 or 'little place to live*.
They would thus be safe-guarded from pauperism and the
desperate trek of the dispossessed.39'*0 <rne process of sub-
division was widespread in the north and was a means whereby
large families unable to purchase more land once prices
spiralled, were able to stay on the land. Yet subdivision,
more often than not, was a short-term expedient bought at
the cost of long-term security. Smaller agricultural units
frequently became uneconomical for those farmers unable to
evolve away from their traditional, extensive farming
methods. Additionally, 'poor whites' and 'bywoners ' were
the first to be dispossessed when subdivision began. In
this way, as a result of subdivision, the pre-industrial
social structure in the north-east was coming under severe
pressure, and the insecurity thus created was certainly a
factor in the rebellion.
The other means of survival for the smaller farmer in the
north was sharecropping, the system of land-tenure whereby
the farmer allowed Black families to settle on his land in
return for a 'share' of their agricultural produce. During
the first post-war decade, with the intense need for both
capital, and labour, sharecropping offered a modicum of
income for a minimum of effort and expense. As long as
agriculture remained relatively unaffected by industrialisa-
tion - under-capitalized and technologically backward, this
type of farming was bound to be the resort of poorer farmers.
Sharecropping also suited absentee landlords with extensive
labour requirements in districts such as Harrismith and
Vrede. This form of land tenure was the cause of intense
conflict in the northern districts and was certainly a
factor in the rebellion. At bottom the struggle was between
smaller farmers and their larger brethren for labour. The
availability of labour meant the difference between the
success or failure of farming operations, hence the intensity
of the struggle, as S. Trapido indicated: 'The drudgery
imposed by the Boer farmer with a limited amount of land
and a limited surplus production that could be allowed the
black labour-tenant meant that the smaller farmer was always
in danger of losing his labour tenants to the large
landowners. The small settler farmer was always hard pressed
to find labour apart from immediate kin ... The inability of
these families to acquire labour contributed in no small
way to their failure to survive as economic entities. |ia
This life and death struggle between farmers underwent" :
transition. Early moves aimed at introducing anti-squatting
legislation came from smaller farmers interested, not so much
in ending the system, as in redistributing squatter labour
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from their larger brethren to themselves. The Squatters
Law, Chapter XXXIV of the Free State Law Book and Law No 4
of 1895 came about as a result of 'populist' pressure:
'Those behind the anti-squatting legislation, were clearly
that great mass of little men; the small occupier - owners
on subdivided farms, the tenants and bywoners who were con-
cerned not only with labour supply, but also with their
security, their social standing and their access to land.
There was an upsurge of resentment against the independence
and prosperity of African peasants. Indignation at having
to compete for markets and for patronage from landowners
and' large landed neighbours was a constant theme in agita-
tion against squatter communities. The threat of economic
competition was a very real one for the smaller producer
lacking resources and capital and landed security.'1*2 The
legislation was a failure as a result of worsening economic
conditions prior to the Anglo-Boer War, together with the
opposition of larger landowners and land companies intent
on squatting and retaining their labour, who conspired to
ensure that this legislation had little effect.
From 1908 onwards, however, agitation began again for
an end to squatting. Now it was the larger commercial
farmers who provided the impetus to coercive action aimed
at ending share-cropping. T. Keegan believes the crucial
new variable came with the opening up of export markets for
maize, which stabilised^ the market, ending the glut-
famine cycle. "*3
Also prominent in the anti-squatting lobby were Afrikaner
'populist' politicians. These politicians were moved by
the increasing dangers of 'poor whiteism1 facing their
people, dangers believed to have resulted in large part,
from the competition of Black sharecroppers. The solution
in 'populist1 terms was two-pronged, firstly an end to
Black squatting, but secondly and crucially, extensive
governmental support for poorer White farmers was demanded,
in terms of economic assistance, labour procurement and
labour regulation. This assistance was to be qiven in
order to offset the effects of ending share-cropping.'*1' It
was the failure of the Botha/Smuts government to provide
support for poorer farmers suffering as a result of the
introduction of this act, which was greatly responsible
for alienating these politicians.
The anti-squatting provisions of the 1913 Land Act were
found to have an adverse effect on large numbers of poorer
farmers and bywoners in the Free State. The ambiguity and
inequitable application of this new legislation became a
source of great confusion and subsequently, of disaffection
amongst Free Staters. In particular great confusion existed
regarding the continued existence of contracts with Black
labourers entered into prior to the promulgation of the
Land Act legislation. It was pointed out that if such
contracts were.subject to immediate cancellation this 'would
result in grievous hardship being inflicted on a very large
number of persons especially in the Northern districts of
the Free State ... where such conditions were in general
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existence1. It was even suggested that the powers of the
Governor General be used to circumvent the Land Act legis-
lation, and allow the continuation of such leases. As was
to be expected, the law officers replied that existing con-
tracts might be fulfilled, but on termination such contracts
were not to be renewed. Resort to the Governor-General could
not be entertained to circumvent restrictive statutes, and
render legal the continued existence 'of a class only
technically servants - with sowing and ploughing rights',
as this would defeat the purpose of the legislation.1*6 A
regular supply of cheap labour was essential to agrarian
operations in the northern Free State. The Land Act served
to further confuse a chaotic and increasingly desperate
situation in which poorer farmers were being denied labour
by larger farmers better placed to attract and retain
labourers.
With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that the
deteriorating labour situation in the north was caused by
the extensive capitalisation and commercialisation of
agriculture. Resentment, however, focussed on the govern-
ment for failing to take strong action to provide the
necessary labour for all needy farmers. It was felt that
labour controls had weakened since Republican times, and
the 1913 Land Act with all its anomalies and restrictions,
was castigated for further weakening the labour structure.
All the magisterial reports mention intense dissatisfaction
with the poor supply of labour following the promulgation
of the Land Act. As Mr A.M. Baumann, the 'law agent1 in
Winburg, noted to one of the rebellion commissions: 'Then
there was also the Native Land Act. A great deal was made
out of that, of course. It was asserted that the farmers
could not make their own agreements with the Native labourers
anymore, and were in short no longer masters of their own
farms'.1*7 General De Wet, the leader of the rebellion in the
Free State, frequently used labour grievances to garner
support for the rebellion. For example, at a meeting at
the Kopjes 'poor white1 settlement on 22 October 1914,
he '.. referred to the question of the natives being allowed
to roam about and not being controlled as they used to be
controlled ... 'w Discontent at deteriorating labour
ccnditlons was certainly a factor in the 1914 rebellion.
Intense disappointment was felt throughout South Africa
during 1910 at the failure of the Union of South Africa to
fulfil expectations: 'Pathetically people continued to
believe that the poverty, insecurity, violence and con-
fusion would.disappear with one wave of the wand of Union ..
All sections of the population and especially 'poor whites'
... had expected the mere act of Union to wreak miracles. "
Conditions in fact grew worse and frustrated.1*9 The bitter-
ness of failed expectations was compounded as"economic
conditions rapidly deteriorated from the 'Great Drought1 of
that year, when post-war recovery was abruptly curtailed.
The magistrate of.Smithfield stated in his report for
191O, that 'the drought was the worst that had been
experienced in the past thirty years, no crops had been
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reaped and nearly all lambs had died, whilst there had been
an estimated loss of 50,000 sheep1.50 The magistrate of the
Jacobsdal district reported that the year had been disas-
trous, with the near ruination of many farmers.51 Conditions
were so severe that large numbers of poorer farmers and
'poor whites' in districts such as Kroonstad, Wepener and
Ficksburg resorted to liquor smuggling and gun-running into
Basutoland.K Wretched conditions afflicted all of the Free
State. In the north, the districts of Senekal, Winburg
and Vredefort were worst affected.53 A large percentage of
the Vredefort district was reported to be 'not far above
the line of actual want1.5*
Amidst such conditions the population needed some form
of assistance to see them through the abnormal period of
drought. Yet the position facing poorer farmers requiring
credit was precarious. On 1st October 1912 the Land and
Agricultural Bank of South Africa was established, creating
hope amongst struggling farmers that government support
would be forthcoming. Such hopes were soon dashed, however,
and bitterness against the government grew as a result.
The Land Bank report for the first year announced that 'the
main object is to assist the farming population by providing
bona fide and deserving applicants with funds at a cheap
rate, repayable in instalments over an extended period1.55
From the outset the Land Bank was run along strictly business
lines, discouraging the hopes of many that it would provide
venture capital by means of which the state could assist
struggling farmers. Advances were only considered on first
mortgages, which generally meant only the wealthier, more
self-sufficient farmers who had been able to survive those
dismal years following the Anglo-Boer War, without resorting
to credit from financial institutions. In addition " bonds
were considered only up to 60% of the security. Again,
richer farmers were favoured because it was frequently the
case that 60% of the value of smaller farms was hardly
worth the trouble in terms of the miniscule loan which would
thereby be advanced. There was also a minimum amount which
could be advanced of £50, which immediately denied landless
farmers any' hope of help and meant that farms had to be
going concerns rather than virgin land or small plots. As
was explained: 'At the time the Land Bank was under con-
sideration it was urgently represented in Parliament that
provision of some kind should be made to assist the farmer
who had no kind of land to offer as security ... Whilst the
claims of these farmers were recognised, Parliament at
that time was not prepared to extend the scope of the Act.
Applications have been continually made to the Bank by
this class of farmer and the Board feels that the grants
of small loans to them would be the saving of many farmers
who otherwise would become poor whites '.K There does seem
to be some substance to Dunbar Moodie's claim that the
establishment of the Land Bank ' ... further concentrated
the hegemony of the Boer gentry"...1 and we can see that
this was perhaps the case, not only in the Transvaal, but
also in the Free State.57
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The failure of the Land Bank to offer any support for
struggling agriculturalists led to farmers turning to store-
keepers and private individuals1 for credit, as Macmillan
noted: '...the Land Bank is useful today chiefly to the
relatively strong men who wish to undertake fencing, irriga-
tion or other such capital schemes. This being so, and the
ordinary banks being necessarily similar, I shall not say
more than that the storekeepers and others are to-day doing
at a high rate of interest what ought to be done by
agricultural credit banks set up for the purpose of tiding
the producers over the period they must want for their crops
to mature. As a result it is not too much to say that
South Africa is something like a Seventh Heaven of the non-
producing speculator and middleman.158 The net result of the
failure of the Land Bank to support poorer farmers was, as
the magistrate of Harrismith indicated, 'the iniquitous
system of long credits' given by storekeepers.59 In the
Frankfort district there was also 'perhaps too great a
habit for a population without methods or experience of
buying or selling to give long credit, a habit which although
derived from past necessity was more or less dangerous1.60
In the Hoopstad district also, 'storekeepers gave long"and
rather unlimited credit which did not tend to place trade
on a sound basis'.Q Particularly in the agrarian north-
eastern districts, smaller farmers unable to find readily
available and affordable credit, were being forced to
resort to moneylenders. The increased cost of using 'store-
keeper1 credit in terms of higher interest rates and
greater insecurity, placed agricultural concerns in jeopardy
particularly during the long drawn-out period of drought
from 1910 to the rebellion.
By the end of 1912, 152 of 224 farms in the Jacobsdal
district were bonded: 'The magistrate did not consider this
tendency a good one as, with few exceptions, the money
market was not being used for improvements, and in the course
of time he feared the result would be that the present land-
owners would be landowners no longer1.63 The magistrate of
Lindley bore out this prognosis by indicating that: 'The
increase in civil cases in this district to nearly double
the total for the previous year ... could only be accounted
for by the fact that the mercantile community was getting
tired of giving unending credit and had during the past
year handed over a large number of overdue accounts for
collection.'61* Thoughts of rebellion amongst indebted
farmers grew," as agricultural conditions steadily worsened.
The money market had begun to collapse, credit was drying
up, hastened by the worsening drought and the consequent
decline in trade. During 1913 industrial unrest added to
this situation as moneylenders, themselves caught in a
credit squeeze situation, began panicking and calling in
bonds.
The Select Committee on Drought Distress Relief examined
the factors leading to the collapse of the credit market
and the effect this had on farmers. Mr John Robb, chairman
of the South African Mutual Life Assurance Company was
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questioned: '- From what you say, I take it that the
private person will advance too much, far more than you will,
in proportion to the value of the land? - Well he advances
more than we would. We want a bigger margin, because we
want a margin that will stand almost any fluctuation,
really.'65 Mr Robb was asked whether there was anything in
the story of 'a lot of cruel moneylenders going about
looking for the blood of the people'.66 Did he not think it
was pretty much a bogey that moneylenders were 'wanting to
snaffle farms and screw the people out of them?1. Mr Robb
would only say that 'there may be an exceptional case here
and there1. He was also asked whether he did not think
that 'it frequently happens that a farmer in order to
obtain money to pay off his interest, borrows money from
a friend or an attorney, or some other institution?1. Mr
Robb replied that he 'knew that this was the case1.67 It
was the private individual or institution holding"the
second bond, who was likely to foreclose the mortgage when
the farmer fell behind on interest payments. Mr Gother
Mann, the General Manager of the South African Association
for the Administration and Settlement of Estates concurred
with Mr Robb. His institution also advanced money largely
on first mortgage, leaving others to loan money at higher
interest rates on the second bond. He was asked whether
it was his experience that private bondholders were much
more likely to press the farmer than companies or institu-
tions holding first mortgage bonds. He replied, 'Yes, I
daresay that would be the case' •6S The position facing
smaller, struggling farmers requiring credit was thus
increasingly bleak. They could expect little or no.help
from the Land Bank, and Building Societies were only pre-
pared to grant small loans on first mortgage bonds which,
excluded the majority of the agriculturalists. Those
farmers who resorted to taking out loans on second mortgages
faced increasing risks of foreclosure as the drought dragged
on, affecting their interest repayments and worsening the
credit squeeze situation.
In their desperate search for some form of support amidst
the impoverished environment of the Free State, large
numbers of plattelanders were turning to the English-
dominated Labour Party which was prepared to promote their
economic interests forcefully. There was a spontaneous
swing to Labour as a result of the industrial unrest of
1913, which elevated the Labour Party to prominence, and
'remarkable progress' was achieved in the Free State
districts of Ficksburg, Brandfort and Bloemfqntein.^ Else-,
where: 'Labour gained a majority in the Transvaal provincial
elections and gained considerable Hertzogite sympathy. For
a while it seemed as if the British Labour and Afrikaner
Hertzogites would unite on economic grounds ... This the
outbreak of the Great War prevented. Hertzogites and some
S.A.P. members were anti-war. Labour dropped its bread
and butter politics to assert its British allegiance.'69
The thrust of the Labour Party, and its appeal to platte-
landers, can be seen in Die Nuwe Politiek, one of the
Afrikaans pamphlets issued by the party. The theme of
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this pamphlet was, 'the mutual interest of the small land-
owner and the white worker as against those of finance
capitalists of the Unionist. Party and the land capitalists
of the South African Party1.70 The sinking of the Lusitania
on 7 May 1915, and the Labour Party commitment thereafter,
to support the British war effort, ended the appeal of the
party for most Afrikaners. Yet prior to the sinking, the
success of the Labour Party provides evidence that political
behaviour in the Free State was motivated by distress:
'During the first half of 1915 the Party optimistically
pursued its rural propaganda, "Never was there a time in the
history of South Africa" maintained a contemporary Labour
leaf let,, "that the Backveld was as receptive to our message
as it is now". Indeed Bunting reported to the administra-
tive council at the beginning of April:'There is no question
that the Dutch speaking population, especially in the Trans-
vaal, but also in the Free State and Cape Colony, is at
present very favourably inclined towards the Labour Party
though to a less extent, to the Hertzog or National Party,
which latter they seem to realise promises them no real
help.171 The political success of this predominantly
British party on the Free State platteland reveals the des-
peration of Afrikaners alienated from their government, and
oppressed by economic forces they barely understood.
The year of the Great War dawned particularly inauspic-
iously in South Africa, with the outbreak in January of a
general strike involving the railways and mines, which was
an extension of the strike of July of the previous year.
The industrial unrest was to have severe consequences on the
agricultural sphere. In 1911 the magistrate of Lindley
had prophetically warned: f... it is difficult to see how
such prices are warranted for dry agricultural land which
in some years could barely bring in the interest on the
mortgages with which many of the farms are encumbered. He
thinks the prices are due, not to speculation, but to land
hunger, and that when improved they will go considerably
higher unless the money market at any time becomes
sufficiently disturbed as to cause withdrawals of capital
advanced when a bad fall in prices is expected1.72 In 1914
the fear expressed by the magistrate of Lindley came to pass.
The money market, unsettled by the industrial unrest of the
previous year, was panicked by a recurrence in 1914, and
moneylenders began foreclosing mortgages. The Land and
Agricultural Bank report for the northern districts of
Vred^ort and Kroonstad noted: fThrough the unsettled state
of the money market and as a result of the drought bonds
have been called up. Many farmers.will not be in a
position to pay off these bonds and now that they will require
the assistance of the Land Bank to help them out of their
difficulties funds are not available1.73 The report also
noted that conditions were steadily deteriorating in the
Free State through prolonged drought,severe hailstorms, loss
of stock, slump of produce and the general depression. Also
important was: 'The closing down of the diamond mines in
consequence of the European War, which closed the markets to
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a number of farmers, caused a great scarcity of ready cash,
and in consequence a great number of debtors were unable to
pay their interest1.71* Economic conditions were so depressed
that formerly solvent farming concerns which had met the
stringent requirements of the Land Bank were falling further
into debt; the situation facing those poorer farmers who
were not eligible for Land Bank loans must have been far
worse.
It had become apparent that demands upon the Land Bank
could not be met from available funds and a limit of £500
was placed on cash advances. In January 1914, however, owing
to the industrial crisis and its effect upon the availability
of funds, the Land Bank resolved to make it a condition of
grants that advances would only be paid out as and when funds
were available. Soon afterwards the operations of the Land
Bank were entirely curtailed and all available funds were
chanelled to the Treasury as a loan at 4$% in order to
assist the war effort. As a result of this action £50,000
had been redirected as of 31 December 1914, money which
would otherwise have been made available for the relief of
farmers.75- The Land Bank report for that year indicated:
'It was particularly distressing to the Board to have to
curtail the operations of the Bank at a period when the
farming community was so urgently in need of assistance.
Many of them had lost a year's return through drought or
absence in the field, and were precluded from carrying out
their farming operations in a manner beneficial to them-
selves and to the State generally1.76 Considerable pressure
was being exerted on the Land Bank by the agricultural
community claiming governmental responsibility for extra-
ordinary support during this period of crisis, a responsi-
bility which the Land Bank was reluctant to assume: 'The
Central Board has been faced with a position of considerable
difficulty regarding the time beyond the date for the pay-
ment of interest and instalments, and this difficulty has
been accentuated by the peculiar light which many borrowers
of public moneys are inclined to regard such debts - a
remission or an abatement at the least is looked for. The
legislature was careful to disabuse Land Bank debtors of
any such possibility ... %71 No help would be forthcoming
from this source.
The rapidly worsening conditions led even magistrates to
plead for support. In a minute to the Minister of Justice,
the magistrate of Lichtenburg, J.C. Juta called for a state
moratorium and warned 'The Government should also consider
the advisability of granting postpon for payment of
debts. People who are in debt and cannot pay become quite
desperate when sued and this creates a great deal of dis-
satisfaction' . ^  The government at this stage, was not
prepared to intervene: 'With regard to a Moratorium, the
government has at present no powers to deal with the matter,
but it is having earnest consideration and will probably
be one of the things dealt with during the coming special
session of Parliament. I shall be glad if you would report
any cases of people who are being unfairly harassed in this
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connection1.79 In denying any. tangible form of assistance to
those struggling farmers with only mortgage foreclosure
ahead, the government was ensuring that they had little to
lose in rebellion.
The option of selling up and migrating elsewhere was no
longer open once the money market crashed, for buyers were
thereafter unable to obtain bonds in the depressed money
market. Plummeting land prices resulting from the credit
squeeze meant that sales would not realise the capital
needed to cover existing bonds obtained during earlier years
of land hunger and price inflation. The situation was
graphically outlined by the magistrate of Frankfort in the
annual report of 1914, 'land at the end of the year was
stated to be unsaleable and the magistrate expressed the
opinion that at a forced sale for cash farmland would
probably not realise more than £1 to 25s per morgen'.80 This
price was for land that had been selling at over £3 per
morgen the previous year. Where land prices remained
stationary it was only because, as in Senekal, 'all selling
stopped, sellers holding out for their price and buyers
refused to give1.81 Sellers were not holding out from a
position of strength, on the contrary, 'most farms carried
heavy bonds and as farmers owing to a succession of bad
seasons, had not been able to reduce them, many were in a
precarious situation financially1.t&
The drought of the previous three years continued
throughout 1914, with devastating effects in most regions of
the Free State. In the Bethulie district, 'considerably
more than half the farmers were compelled to trek to the
Cape in search of grazing1. Farmers were likewise compelled
to trek from the Bethlehem, Brandfort, Lindley, Philippolis,
Rouxville, Thaba Nchu, Vredefort and Winburg districts.
Farmers in the Fauresmith district were reported to have lost
75% of their stock and in the Thaba Nchu district 50% of
stock perished'.83 In the Bethlehem district which was 'one
of the best districts in the Free State1, crops were very
small in comparison with former years, and in some cases were
a total failure. In the Vredefort and Kroonstad districts,
fanners were unable to pay the interest on their bonds and
White labourers were stated to be obtainable at 2/6d per
day where 'poor whites1 had formerly refused to work for 5/-
per day'.81* In the Frankfort district land was unsaleable,
whilst in Senekal, the low prices offered by buyers meant
that farmers could not cover their bond repayments. The
drought led to a great increase in stock diseases such as
anthrax, 'gallamziekte1, 'gielziekte', 'lamziekte' , 'spons-
ziekte' and wireworm which took a heavy toll of cattle and
smaller stock. 'Lamziekte1 was particularly devastating,
with the result that the livestock industry 'so essential
to general revenue was faltering1 and 'a situation comparable
to the Rinderpest epidemic had developed.85 Worse still was
to come, as wool and cattle prices slumped after the out-
break of the First World War in August. The magistrate of
Smithfield reported, 'owing to the slump in the price of
wool, farmers were compelled to hold back their clips or
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sell at a great sacrifice and, as a result they were very-
short of cash1 .86
Because of the industrial unrest and the decline in
trade, the commercial depression worsened, and the economy
rapidly approached a crisis.87 The rise in the price of basic
commodities during this period added to the misery, and in
the Bethulie district the magistrate met with shopkeepers
in an effort to fix the price of necessities.88 There are
indications though, that elsewhere commodity prices were not
moderated such as in Hoopstad, which was soon to go into
rebellion: 'In Hoopstad the outbreak of the European War
disastrously affected all trade in wool, hides, mohair and
livestock. At the same time bills were falling due, cattle
dying of gallamziekte and, later, from poverty, and food-
stuffs in the way of meal and flour rising in price'.89
During the second half of the year destitution became readily
apparent, particularly in Fauresmith which: 'probably felt
the effects of the European War more severely and instantan-
eously than any other district in the Province, for within
seven days of the outbreak of the war both the big mines at
Jagersfontein and Koffyfontein closed down. In Jagersfontein
the effect was appalling as many men with large families were
thrown out of employment and faced with destitution and
starvation The Koffyfontein Mine continued work on a
smaller scale with White labour only for a couple of months
then shut down altogether. Rations were issued to the
families of needy employees ... The Provincial Administration
also came to the rescue, dispensing with native labour gangs
as opportunity offered, and substituting White labour.
Local distress funds were also started to deal with the more
needy cases.190 The majority of miners thrown out of work had
no chance of obtaining employment in the Free State and were
forced to migrate to the Transvaal mines. In an investigation
of the unrest at the Van Ryn Deep goldmine at Boksburg during
1917, it was pointed out that the labour force contained
approximately 2,500 Afrikaners from the Free State who had
obtained employment in place of those miners leaving on
active service.91 The inspector of police in charge of the
investigation was 'inclined to think that the majority have
been forced to seek employment on tbe mines through failure
of crops and drought on the farms'.92 He added: 'It is
without doubt, a fact that the largest proportion of Dutch
miners are members of the Nationalist Party and it is there
that the danger lies for they would seize any pretext to
jeopardise the position of the Government and with it the
British regime in South Africa. For this reason should there
be a strike, I believe that "race hatred" will replace
"class hatred" making a rebellion possible1.93 The forced
migration of platteland miners from the south-western districts
further reveals the growth of discontent in those areas which
had become centres for the dispossessed. .
There was no hope of relief for Free State farmers amidst
such conditions of widespread destitution, and as a result,
the promise of reward by the rebels was certainly a factor
which influenced some Free Staters into rebellion. In the
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Heilbron district there was a 'poor white1 settlement run by-
General De Wet. This area was"turned into a focal point of
the rebellion by the General who promised rewards to those
who would join him: fI wish it to be known that my intention
is, that if we are to attain our ideal, these burghers who
support our endeavour to attain independence are to receive
a reward. The money for this must come out of an assessment
levied upon the burghers who remained at home, the unfaith-
ful who fought against us, and the mines1.* The rebels
deliberately spread the rumour that they had received a great
deal of financial support from the German government, in
order to attract struggling men to their cause.96 We can see
the influence of such financial inducements on simple country
folk, in the evidence of Mr F.W.C. Buitendag of Lichtenburg
who was approached by a man called Bodenstein: '... he told
me that ... the five shillings a day which the burghers were
promised in the last war would be paid out with our own
money. In this connection he referred to the bars of
unminted gold which were taken away from the Transvaal. All
that, he said, had been sent to Germany to be minted into
money out of which the 5s a day.would be paid1.96 The
failure of most of the earlier interpretations of the
rebellion is that the element of self-interest is denied the
rebels. An examination of the motives of the rebel leaders
similarly reveals the self-interest motive, often concurrent
with political idealism. Far from acting according to any
resolute plan of rebellion, rebel leaders vacillated,
assessing their support and chances of success. As such,
patriotic fervour takes on the appearance of calculated
oppor tun i sm.
Of the rebel leaders, only Colonel S.G. 'Manie' Maritz on
the border of German South West Africa appears to have had
implacable resolve: his hatred of the British led him
unerringly into rebellion. Yet lack of substantial support
outside the Kenhardt area and its surrounds, doomed his
uprising to failure: 'Maritz's efforts to spread his
revolt in the north-western Cape failed completely, both in
the early stage and after Kemp's arrival. Properly viewed
the rebellion was confined to the former republics, ' 97-
Maritz was forced to rely on young men brought 'off the
veld'98 lacking in experience and coerced by a variety of
tactics, 'in other words they went into the thing without
knowing what it really meant1.99
As has already been recognised, the Orange Free State was
the focal point of the rebellion. The history of this
province to the end of the Anglo-Boer War was one of great
adversity. The Free State in particular, was subject to
wars, natural depredations and widespread economic disloca-
tion. In the post-war period, far from conditions improving,
the province.was now faced with the effects of the extensive
capitalisation and commercialisation of agriculture. Those
sections of the pre-industrial society which were unable or
unwilling to evolve, found themselves engaged in a grim
struggle for survival on many fronts.
In the pastoral south-west of the Free State the lack of
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support by the government in the post-Anglo. Boer War period
led to this society being unable to reconstitute itself,
and thus migrating to other areas of South Africa where
land was still cheap. The resentment felt by such farmers
was made manifest when most of these pools of defeated Free
Staters joined the rebellion against a government which they
felt had failed them.
In the north-eastern Free State, however, the forces of
the past and those of the industrial future locked in mortal
combat. The struggle was uneven and the pre-industrial
society received scant assistance from the government either
through the Land Bank, or in terms of securing a regular
supply of labour. The failure of support from the government
in a period of high mortgage rates thrust more and more of
these agriculturalists into the unkindly clutches of money-
lenders. The Labour Party too, which had aroused hopes,
lost its credibility for such farmers when it leaned towards
confrontation with Germany in 1914.
The conditions facing the smaller agriculturalists in the
north-east steadily worsened towards a crisis. The outbreak
of the war, together with industrial unrest, the devastating
drought of the past three years and the slump in produce
prices, concurrent with the rise in the price of consumer
items, led to a severe depression. This depression was to
push farmers to the limit. Accumulated grievances had long
been focussed on the government by a discontented society
too poorly educated to comprehend the reasons for its pre-
dicament. Amidst such conditions, the political opposition
to the invasion of German South West Africa, and the distaste
felt at fighting for Britain found a ready ear. So too, did
the financial inducements held out to farmers by the rebels
who well knew that 'rebellion does not .seem such a serious
thing to desperate men'.
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